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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND TURBULENCE: 
THE EVOLUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY COMPLEX 
AT NIAGARA FALLS, 1896-1906 
Robert Belfield* 
(Received 10 October 19 80. Revised/Accepted 15 May 19 81.) 
'(The) American and Canadian systems were regarded as one.'1 (Harold Buck, 1906) 
The Niagara Falls Power Company introduced, in 1895-96, an electric power system which redefined Niagara Falls as one of the world's greatest energy resources. Harnessed to the new technology, the hydroelectric potential of Niagara Falls, Ontario, exceeded by a factor of seven that of Nia­gara Falls, NY. The company had secured in 1892 from the 'host government* of Ontario an ZXCIU&ZVQ. franchise for the development of the Ontario site. With its technology thus protected at Niagara, the firm planned to create an inter­national, interconnected power system — an international Niagara monopoly. Yet the enterprise failed to appreciate the turbulent impact of its technological innovation in eas­tern Canada where the scarcity of useful coal and the abun­dance of water power created an enormous demand for the new technology. Power interests in eastern Canada acted quick­ly: companies in Québec immediately adopted the Niagara system and even transferred it to Hamilton — the largest industrial market in the Niagara region of Ontario. These moves forced the government of Ontario to renegotiate, in 1899, the Niagara Co.'s exclusive franchise. With compe­tition possible, the focus of technological activity then shifted from Niagara Falls, NY to Niagara Falls, Ontario. There, both private and public interests formed to plan Niagara projects involving massive generating stations (GS) and high voltage (HV) transmission networks to compete for distant markets. An energy revolution in eastern Canada was in progress. 
My purpose here is not to argue political and economic questions such as the merits of the private versus public enterprises but rather to examine the history of the evolu­tion, transfer, and diffusion of this new technological system. The Niagara Co. introduced a seminal technological system or model — so successful that earlier hydraulic power firms at Niagara became immediately obsolete. Method­ically, Niagara Co. engineers decided to improve system de­signs in association with plans for expansion to meet unex­pectedly great demand in its existing local and Buffalo 
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markets. The Niagara system design evolution culminated in the firm's fully owned, interconnected Canadian subsidiary, the Canadian Niagara Power Company. In the sense that Niagara Co. engineers were primarily responsible for this evolution of an interconnected, international system, the developed Niagara system at Canadian Niagara remained a firm-specific model. Just as Québec firms imitated the original Niagara system of 1895-96, private competitors at the Falls largely imitated the developed Canadian Niagara designs. 
It will be argued firstly that the Niagara Co. lost many re­turns from its work because the firm failed to synchronize its design evolution with the turbulent environment which its technology fostered in eastern Canada. Second, it will be argued that the transfer and diffusion of Niagara Co. designs to eastern Canada — a complex, subtle and interre­lated process mainly involving the movement of designs and individuals ~ structured the formation and strategy of Ontario Hydro. Since previous political and economic his­torians have treated separately the history of the Niagara Co. and that of the origins of Ontario Hydro,2 this paper hopes to show that, above all, an evolving technological system constituted the historical continuity between the two. Unfortunately, this effort to show the technological continuity among numerous enterprises necessitates a 'com­pany history' approach which makes impossible a strictly chronological overall account. 
THE EVOLUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
In 1895-96, the Niagara Falls Power Co. introduced its pioneering invention of a universal electric power system. To briefly abstract the invention of the 'Niagara system', which has been analyzed in detail elsewhere,3 it had cen­tred upon the adoption of a polyphase current system, and the design evolution of an appropriate generator and coupling devices to transform raw power into the current needed by lighting, traction (trolleys) and industrial cus­tomers. Once polyphase redefined Westinghouse's 'alter­nating current' into rsingle phase,1 polyphase came to re­fer to a single phase, two phase or three phase alternating current system. A polyphase system offered two main advan­tages over direct current (dc): first, voltage transforma­tion allowed for transmission beyond dc's five mile practi­cal limit; second, a rotary converter could transform poly­phase power into dc. European companies had shown that three phase offered the advantage of inexpensive transmis­sion but that two phase offered the advantage of relatively simply generator design — and the generator was the most expensive equipment in the Niagara Co.'s high risk, pion­eering project. 
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Guided by Chief Engineer Coleman Sellers, the Niagara Co. aimed for a two phase central station to furnish power for both the local and long distance markets of Buffalo and southern Ontario, Along with a Westinghouse team directed by Lewis B. Stillwell, firm engineers designed a two phase, external revolving field alternator to generate at 2,200 volts/5,000 hp and planned for a ten unit station (50,000 hp). They selected a 25 Herz frequency as a compromise in order to best serve light and power markets since any lower frequency caused flickering in incandescent lamps; in addi­tion, rotary converters, needed to capture the dc motor (including traction) markets, operated well at this fre­quency. Phase converter transformer connections, which were invented by Charles Scott, allowed for the coupling of two and three phase circuits. The firm decided to trans­form the two phase generated power into three phase for a 22 mile, 11,000 volt (11 kV) transmission line to Buffalo. Beginning in August 1895, the Niagara system central sta­tion supplied all currents needed by lighting, traction and industrial motors, and the new (mainly single phase) elec­tric furnace market. While Niagara engineers dramatically advanced central station technology, Niagara Line Superin­tendent Paul Lincoln observed that the Niagara - Buffalo line relied upon the existing state of the art of telegraph transmission line technology. The line opened in late 1896 and experienced serious insulation difficulties — and the severe lightning storms characteristic of the region wor­sened this problem.4 Nevertheless, the 'Niagara system1 was regarded as a pioneering, exciting and successful in­vention. 
The Niagara Co. viewed the first GS and HV line to Buffalo as the first step in its development of an international system, but Niagara engineers quickly recognized a simple and fundamental dilemma in this strategy. As a synchron­ous system, the Niagara system demanded voltage stability but the increase of both customers and long distance lines adversely effected voltage stability. Poor line insulators, short circuits in new distribution networks, and imbalances resulting from increasingly complex load (supply) manage­ment each caused voltage irregularity which asynchronized, or threw out of step, the whole system from substation cable to Niagara generator. The demand for system expan­sion was all too clear, especially from the electrochem­ical and electrometallurgical firms which were rushing to establish huge plants at Niagara Falls, NY in order to take advantage of the inexpensive power rates. But the Niagara Co. also took seriously its plan to capture and develop Buffalo and southern Ontario markets. The firm had secured, in 1892, an exclusive franchise for hydro de­velopment at Niagara Falls, Ontario, where power potential was seven times greater than at Niagara Falls, NY; in re­turn, the company promised to develop a mere 10,000 hp at this site by 1898. In terms of existing Niagara 
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technology, this figure signified either two generating units or a transmission line and distributing substation; the former option in fact implied a full GS context while the latter option involved serious insulation problems. 
With plans for the eventual establishment of stations and lines on both sides of the Falls, the Niagara Co. envisioned the pleasant prospect of a virtual power monopoly in the international Niagara region. By 1898, the firm committed the full planned capacity of the first GS; by 1901, it was both building a duplicate GS and line project as well as completing design plans for the technological culmination of the Niagara system — the subsidiary Canadian Niagara Power Co. at Niagara Falls, Ontario. During this period of expansion, Lewis Stillwell was Niagara Co. Electrical Director until 1900 when Harold Buck succeeded him. Both Stillwell and Buck conceived expansion in terms of the evo­lution of a single system or power pool, and both planned to interconnect the new plants with the old. Not surpris­ingly, Stillwell and Buck concentrated upon system problem solutions in their efforts to build incrementally an inter­national, interconnected system at Niagara. 
Immediately after 1896, Niagara engineers responded to ex­ploding power demand by installing all ten units in GS 1 and by planning a duplicate project; a new, separate transmission line and a second GS at the Falls. The new line consisted of three 10,000 hp circuits and was built parallel to the original line: henceforth, the failure of one line could not sever power transmission to Buffalo. Stillwell and Paul Lincoln, the Line Superintendent, adop­ted a new insulator which offered greater mechanical strength by a more secure fixture of pin and insulator,6 but the new insulators succeeded only marginally. Given the inverse relation between copper costs and transmission voltage, Stillwell doubled to 22 kv the line voltage. The higher voltage helped offset the costs of needing to build a separate line to help ensure service continuity. The Cataract Power and Conduit Co., the Niagara Co. subsidiary for power distribution in Buffalo, stepped down the power to 11 kV for underground distribution to seven substations. Stillwell described the overall load of the system: 
The local load varies between 14,200 kw. and 15,700 kw. This remarkable unifor­mity of output is explained by the fact that nearly all of the power used locally is delivered to manufacturing companies whose processes are continuous and whose use of power is practically constant. The long distance load varies from a minimum of 3,300 to a maximum of 15,600 kw. Of this maximum, probably 90% is used for railway and lighting purposes.7 
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When the lights blacked out and the trolleys stopped, the 
Buffalo public was aware of technical problems in the 
Niagara system. 
The interconnection of the entire system from substation cables to Niagara generators made critical the need to pro­tect the system from excessive voltage variation. As new distribution feeder cables were laid to new customers, ac­cidental short circuits increased. Similarly, an increas­ing number of large customers at Niagara entailed increas­ingly complex load management: like short circuits, sudden substantial load changes resulted in voltage variations with their dangerous asynchronizing effects on the system. Although insulators remained inadequate, the overall prob­lem was reduced by a successful attack on short circuits in distribution cables. Niagara and General Electric (GE) engineers devised an automatic time-limit relay circuit breaker which isolated short circuits to the feeder (cable) alone 'without opening the main transmission circuits at the Niagara end and so interrupting the entire long dis­tance service.•8 The breaker needed to function quickly because short circuits involved voltage drops which, if prolonged, would 'cause all of the synchronous apparatus to drop out of step.'9 The new device worked within a three second period: the breaker isolated within a fraction of a second the troubled feeder, opened within one second the terminal line, and opened within three seconds the 22 kV transmission line. Then, the process reversed automati­cally for restart. The new invention thus allowed for an incremental shutdown and an automatic incremental restart within a matter of seconds. 
The new GS was the setting for another system improvement. Whereas most utilities served numerous small power con­sumers, the Niagara Co. served a small number of large power consumers in the local market — and, similarly, sold bloc power to its Buffalo subsidiary distributing station. Single phase electric furnaces posed especially serious voltage problems: 
Since it is impossible to control these furnaces, so that at all times the same number shall be in operation from each of the two phases, inequality of load on the phase results and the voltages are un­balanced. This unbalancing is disastrous to polyphase synchronous and induction motors on the system, for the high voltage phase tends to carry all the load, and windings on this phase are overloaded. These results can be rendered inappreciable only by the use of generators of close regulation.10 
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The new GS contained eleven generating units manufactured by GE — the last five following an internal revolving field design11 — whose voltage regulation exceeded by a factor of three that of the original units. Otherwise, the new units bore the same electrical design standards as the first Niagara generatorf i.e. 25 Hz frequency, 5,000 hp, two phase, 250 rpm, and 2,200/2,300 v. In order to ascer­tain closer regulation, Paul Lincoln invented a frequency indicator-which measured a generator's speed independent of voltage.1 Lincoln based the new meter upon his synchro­scope which he had invented in 1895 to help synchronize the generators for the purpose of paralleling — or power pooling. The third improvement of the "GS 2 - line 2' pro­ject over the original Niagara system was a centralized switchboard which simplified the task of paralleling the units in both GS -~ made possible by the common 25 Hz fre­quency. Two GS buildings supplied a single interconnected system. 
Harold Buck, Niagara Electrical Director as of 1900, iden­tified the automatic circuit breaker, closer generator reg­ulation, and the new switchboard as the three major advan­ces of this second project. Since these advances were directed towards system-wide problems and power management, the Niagara system was evolving on a system basis. Niagara Co. engineers, rather than the electrical manufacturers, were primarily responsible for designing and directing this evolution. While Westinghouse had equipped GS 1, GE e-quipped GS 2; in both cases, the apparatus was supplied ac­cording to design specifications issued by Niagara Co. engineers. Admittedly, these specifications sometimes rested upon joint utility-manufacturer design and testing work — as was the case with the circuit breaker. Overall, then, the Niagara system remained a firm-specific system. A certain momentum towards standardization had, however, set in. Interconnection necessitated some standardization of generation equipment and both major electrical manufac­turers, Westinghouse and GE, had participated in Niagara Co. projects; consequently, each manufacturer could offer its own version of Niagara designs. Only the Niagara Co.'s exclusive franchise prevented the immediate formation of competing projects at the Falls. When the exclusive fran­chise collapsed in 1899 (to be discussed later), two sep­arate groups planned their own projects at Niagara Falls, Ontario — the Ontario Power Company based in Buffalo and the Electrical Development Company based in Toronto. 
Worried by this competitive threat to its dream of a Nia­gara monopoly, the Niagara Co. quickly planned a third GS, the Canadian Niagara Power Co., which was the firm's fully owned subsidiary at Niagara Falls, Ontario. Electrical Director Harold Buck presided over the design of Canadian Niagara as the most advanced of the firm's projects, and intended to allot its power to both Toronto and to existing 
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markets. Buck explained his design policies in a presenta­tion to the American Institute of Electrical Engineers. Aside from a doubling in capacity, the hydraulic features of the earlier plants were retained. Buck adopted his engineers* recommendation to double unit capacity from 5,000 hp to 10,000 hp in order to cut in half construction costs per horsepower — since either unit would occupy the same physical wheelpit space.14 Niagara engineers retained the 250 rpm turbo-generator speed and internal revolving field design features but proceeded to design an advanced generator for Canadian Niagara: they issued to GE design specifications for a unit to generate at 12 kV/10,000 hp of three phase current. Buck explained that 'after a radi­us of about one mile is exceeded, it becomes cheaper to transform to 12,000 volts three phase and distribute at this voltage than to supply power directly at 2,200 volts.'15 
These design advances rested upon the continuing use of a 25 Hz frequency — perhaps the heart of the evolving sys­tem. A uniform frequency, along with phase converters to couple the two phase and three phase units, allowed for interconnection into one system. Buck announced: 
The frequency will be retained at 25 cycles for the sake of uniformity with the American plants so as to permit of parallel operation. In selecting a unit of this large size, the American and Canadian systems were regarded as one.1** 
To ease interconnection, the engineers allotted one switch­board per five units17 and thus simulated the capacity of GS 1 and GS 2 (50,000 hp); ten units were planned for Canadian Niagara (120,000 hp). 1 8 The company also advanced to 60 kV its high voltage insulation standard for the firm hoped to transmit economically to Toronto. The line in­sulators were designed to be constructed of 'electrose1, a new material with greater resistance to a popular (some­what, dangerous) habit of using insulators for target prac­tice. It was not until 1907, however, that Buck managed to introduce the truly effective Buck-Hewlett suspended in­sulator which revolutionized HV transmission. 
Contrary to the arrangement shown in Buck's diagram (see Diagram #1), Canadian Niagara did not transmit to Toronto when the plant opened in 1906. Instead, the company sold some of its power at Niagara Falls, NY, and transmitted the bulk of it to Buffalo on a new 24 kV line — although Canadian Niagara was insulated at 60 kV. The new line crossed the border at Fort Erie, Ontario, and interconnec­ted with the earlier lines at the Buffalo terminal station. As Buck pointed out, this arrangement virtually guaranteed continuity of service since 'it is exceedingly improbable 
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that a storm would ever extend over a sufficient area to cause simultaneous interruptions on both the Canadian and American transmission systems.'2^ This contribution to system reliability resulted less from technological ration­ality than from the Niagara Co.1s effective loss of the Ontario market. Technologically, Canadian Niagara repre­sented the advanced culmination of one system which had evolved, as we have seen, in an incremental, technologi­cally rational manner. By the time that the enterprise realized its plan for a reliable, interconnected, interna­tional system, competing enterprises had undermined the firm's grip on Ontario markets. The Mackenzie Syndicate's success in securing a Niagara franchise was especially ef­fective in aborting the Niagara Co.1s plan for a Toronto transmission. The Niagara enterprise therefore retreated to the rich and secure markets of Niagara Falls, NY and Buffalo. 
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INTER-COMPANY TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION 
AND STANDARDIZATION 
Upon its introduction in 1895-96, the Niagara system immed­iately ignited an unforeseen degree of enthusiasm in both Québec and Ontario due to the shortage of useful coal and abundance of water power in eastern Canada. Because the exclusive franchise precluded diffusion at the Falls, the Niagara system was adopted first in Québec; the Westing-house Co. functioned as the central source of personnel and technology in the transfer of various aspects of the Niagara system to that province. There, the Royal Electric Co. of Montréal (1890) and the Shawinigan Water and Power Co. (1899) imitated the Niagara Co.'s technological designs and soon advanced HV technology in order to transmit over longer distances. Because these firms directly influenced hydroelectric development in the Niagara region of Ontario, we cannot neglect this unexpected route of transfer and diffusion. Specifically, the Cataract Power Co. was formed in 1896 to devise a hydro project on the Niagara escarpment for transmission to Hamilton; this firm turned for techni­cal guidance and supply to Royal Electric. The Shawinigan Co. was incorporated in 1899 to undertake a transmission to Montréal — over 90 miles distant; if that was possible, so was a transmission over the shorter distance between Niagara and Toronto. Once the Niagara Co.'s exclusive franchise ended, the Ontario Power Co. and the Electrical Development Co. formed to exploit the enormous potential of Niagara Falls, Ontario. Although Quebec's experience was not lost upon them, both companies turned to the Niagara Co. as their model. Since the Niagara Co. had captured the Niagara Falls, NY market, Ontario Power and Electrical Development especially sought long distance markets in Ontario and upstate New York. Compared to the Niagara Co.'s relatively controlled transfer of its designs to its Canadian subsidiary project, the free and uncontrolled adoption of Niagara Co. designs by numerous companies was a disjointed and chaotic process ordered only by the move­ment of individuals and by approximate design standardiza­tion by electrical manufacturers. 
The Royal Electric Co. of Montréal was a corporate descen­dant of the Thomson-Houston Co. of Canada (1883) , and the firm remained technologically linked with American elec­trical manufacturers. Indeed, Royal Electric's chief elec­trician was Fred Thomson who was the brother of Elihu Thomson — the co-founder of Thomson-Houston. In 1894, Royal Electric purchased the exclusive Canadian franchise for the manufacture of equipment designed by the Stanley Electrical Manufacturing Co. of Great Barrington, Ma.21 — a 'spin off of William Stanley's early pioneering design work at Westinghouse. The Stanley, Kelley, Chesney system, popularly referred to as the 'SKC' line, was an alternating current (single phase) system which supplied arc lights, 
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incandescent lights, and motors.zz In 1895, Royal Electric appointed William H. Browre to the post of General Manager. Browne had helped Frank Sprague pioneer his electric trac­tion system in Richmond, Va., until 1891 when Browne joined Westinghouse. Browne worked at Westinghouse when that firm concentrated its talents upon the Niagara pro­ject. At Royal Electric, Browne suggested and presided over that firm's adoption of the Niagara two phase univer­sal system. The new switchboard indicated the new "univer­sal combination' plan, by means of which there is an inter-changeability of circuits, dynamo and exciter connect­ions'23 — that is, generator paralleling and centralized supply management. J.A. Kammerer, a Royal Electric engin­eer, proceeded to recommend to the Canadian Electrical Association2 the two phase system as the best means of in­creasing the load factor — the percentage of power sales over full capacity. Kammerer pointed out the universal market advantage of Royal Electric's new system and advised the selection of diverse customers whose power needs over­lapped minimally during a 24 hour period as a means of in­creasing the load factor. Kammerer thus articulated what Samuel Insull later termed and developed as the 'diversity factor.'25 Of course, the Niagara Co. had the highest load factor on the continent, largely due to tis electrochemical and electrometallurgical clients who needed large blocs of continuous (24 hour) power. Royal Electric needed to adapt the system to diversified urban markets. 
As of 189 7, Royal Electric began to diffuse its new system. In Québec, the firm engaged in projects at Trois-Riviêres2^ and Chambly. The Chambly plant transmitted at 12 kV over 25 miles to Royal Electric's Montréal lighting station.27 Royal Electric also agreed to supply the Cataract Power Co. in Hamilton — to be discussed below. In 1901, Browne di­vested the company, selling its manufacturing business to Canadian GE and merging its Montreal plant with the Chairibly Manufacturing Co. and the Montreal Gas Co. to form the Montreal Light, Heat, and Power Co. This consolidation, which formed 'the largest industrial organization in the Dominion,'2 became one of the main clients of the Shawini-gan Water and Power Co. 
Incorporated in 1899, the Shawinigan Co. boldly imported the Niagara system to develop hydro power at Shawinigan Falls for local supply and for transmission to both Trois-Rivières and Montréal.29 Chief Engineer Wallace C. Johnson had been employed at the Niagara Falls Hyraulic and Manu­facturing Co. until the Niagara system made obsolete hy­draulic power supply at Niagara. Johnson adopted the Niagara system for Shawinigan: the turbo-generator units imitated almost exactly the Niagara designs and were ac­quired from the same manufacturers, I.P. Morris and West­inghouse. The Shawinigan generator was external revolving field, two phase, 2,200 V, and 3,750 kw (5,000 hp) but it 
79 
generated 30 Hz power, Shawinigan's 30 Hz power frequency was close enough to Niagara's 25 Hz frequency to indicate that it aimed at the same market spectrum as the Niagara project,31 Indeed, Niagara and Shawinigan even shared the same first customer: the Northern Aluminum Co, was the Canadian subsidiary of the Pittsburgh Reduction Co. which had been the Niagara Co.'s first customer.32 Shawinigan thus provided a striking example of just the sort of com­petition through technological imitation which the Niagara Co. feared at Niagara Falls, Ontario, But competition in­volved more than the Niagara location: by the time Canadi­an Niagara started power service in 1906, important alumi­num and carbide customers had already contracted to locate their subsidiary plants at Shawinigan Falls. 3 
Shawinigan's long distance transmission involved a major advance in that the firm planned to transmit over 90 miles at 50 kV. Unfortunately, all that we know about this line design is that the engineer in charge was Ralph D. Mershon.34 Mershon's involvement helps to explain the ad­vance: he had participated with Charles F. Scott and V.G. Converse in the pioneering Telluride High Voltage experi­ments of 1894.35 Mershon applied this advanced High Vol­tage design knowledge in Québec. The site of advanced HV work then returned to Niagara Falls, Ontario, where Canadi­an Niagara was first to plan 60 kv insulation (and Harold Buck introduced in 190 7 the suspended insulator), Mershon and V.G. Converse soon reunited at Niagara in work on be­half of the Ontario Power Co. 
The first Niagara-based hydro project in Ontario drew upon Quebec's work to supply power to Hamilton, the most indus­trialized market in the Niagara region. The Cataract Power Co. was incorporated in 1896 by local businessmen for the hydro development of DeCew Falls, on the Niagara escarp­ment, in order to transmit power over a 32-mile distance to Hamilton. Although J.M. Gibson, Cataract President, also participated in the incorporation of Canadian West-inghouse (Hamilton, 1896),3*> the power company turned to Royal Electric for technical equipment and management: Cataract appointed H.R. Leyden of Royal Electric as Manager and J.A. Kammerer of Royal Electric as Electrical Adviser. They installed two phase-redesigned SKC equipment for the 22.5 kV transmission37 to the Hamilton Electric Light and Power Co. Cataract soon centralized in one substation dis­tribution service to Hamilton Electric Light, the Hamilton Street Railway Co., and the Hamilton Radial Railway Co. As at Niagara, this specific system of electric power sparked industrial growth: 'The growth of manufacturing establishments in Hamilton in late years has been due in large part to the adoption of electricity as a motive power ... today the factory not using electric motors is an exception,'^8 reported Canadian EtactnicaZ Neto* in 1904. By then, Browne had divested Royal Electric and Hamilton 
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turned to Westinghouse equipment supply for a full-scale conversion to the universal polyphase system.39 Technolog­ical continuity with the Niagara model underlay this vivid example of desirable and clean urban growth. To sum up, the Niagara Co.*s lack of control over the transfer and diffusion of its designs to Québec resulted in the loss of the Hamilton market to a local enterprise and the loss of preferred customers to the imitative Shawinigan project. Clearly, the associated impact upon urban and economic or­ganization is worthy of further, detailed investigation. 
A similar process began in 1899 at Niagara Falls, Ontario. The Niagara Co. failed to develop by 1 November 189 8 10,000 hp at Niagara Falls, Ontario, and therefore did not fulfill the condition of its exclusive franchise. That is not so surprising. During 1897, the firm was still com­pleting GS 1, was beginning excavations for GS 2, and was trying to solve system problems. While the Ontario reac­tion will be noted later, its result was the renegotiated contract of August 1899 by which the Niagara Co. lost its exclusive rights. The technological centre of gravity then began to shift from Niagara Falls, NY to Niagara Falls, Ontario in terms of both the number of projects and the degree of technological advancement utilized. The Niagara Co. was first to plan a project for the Ontario site, and I have discussed the subsidiary Canadian Niagara plant. Two other companies, the Ontario Power Co. and the Electri­cal Development Co., soon planned to develop power at the Ontario site. 
Financed from Buffalo, the Ontario Power Co. received in 1899 a franchise to divert water at Niagara Falls, Ontario, for the ultimate development of 180,000 hp — the largest project at the international site. Ontario Power President P.L. Nunn had owned the Telluride Power Co. where he had presided over the early pioneering HV experiments of Charles F. Scott, V.G. Converse, and Ralph Mershon — men­tioned earlier. Nunn now appointed V.G. Converse to the post of Chief Electrical Engineer, and hired Mershon from Shawinigan as a transmission consultant. That these en­gineers chose to imitate largely the turbo-generator de­signs of Canadian Niagara indicated the respect held by the profession for the continuing pioneering status of the Niagara enterprise. Arranged horizontally, the 12,000 hp Francis turbines were direct connected to Westinghouse generators which delivered three phase, 25 Hz current at 12 ky and 187.5 rpm. Though slightly larger, Ontario Power generators thus borrowed essentially the Canadian Niagara electrical design. Ontario Power advanced switching by adopting a *unit value* design in which each unit could be operated as an isolated power plant or paralleled in any combination with other units? later large stations tended to adopt this relatively safe unit switching plan.40 
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Ontario Power's first major customer was an HV transmission company formed to transmit Niagara power between Buffalo and Syracuse — the Niagara, Lockport and Ontario Power Co. Niagara Lockport became, in 1904, a subsidiary of Ontario Power, with which it contracted for power supply.41 Ralph Mershon designed a 154-mile trunk line between the border tie line and Syracuse to operate at 60 kV.42 Ontario Power thus advanced beyond the Canadian Niagara model in terms of HV long distance transmission. Since Canadian Niagara had been insulated for 60 kV as well, the Ontario Power ad­vance was more a marketing than a technological development. Deprived of the Niagara and Buffalo markets, Ontario Power extended over greater distances in search of regional mar­kets. 
The third firm to receive a franchise at Niagara Falls, Ontario was the Electrical Development Co. and its subsid­iary HV transmission organization, the Toronto Niagara Power Co. Three powerful men in Toronto organized this enterprise in 1902; by then, the Shawinigan, Canadian Niagara, and Ontario Power projects provided sufficient precedents to limit the risk. William Mackenzie was Presi­dent of the Toronto Street Railway Co., and, perhaps, the leading financier of traction in Canada. Frederic Nicholls was General Manager of Canadian General Electric. Lt. Col. Henry H.M. Pellatt was President of the Toronto Electric Light Co. Popularly known as the 'Mackenzie Syndicate', these three men controlled most electric utilities in Toronto — that is, they owned the Toronto market for Niagara power. Not too surprisingly, Canadian Niagara tried to block the Syndicate's franchise application,43 but the Syndicate managed to secure in January 190 3 a franchise for an ultimate development of 125,000 hp. The Syndicate hired F.O. Blackwell as Chief Electrical Engineer and Hugh L. Cooper of New York City as Chief Hydraulic Engineer. Cooper, who was relatively unknown at this time but later became a world leader in hydro projects, introduced some novel hydraulic plans but the turbo-generators displayed very little novelty except for their size: these were the largest units at Niagara but by a factor of only 500 hp. Following Canadian Niagara's model, Electrical Development adopted the I.P. Morris Co. Francis turbines (12,500 hp) direct connected to GE internal revolving field, three phase, 25 Hz, 12 kV, 250 rpm generators. Indeed, these 12,500 hp generators followed Canadian Niagara designs to the extent that slides to illustrate them in public addres­ses were actually pictures of the Canadian Niagara unit: '"These machines will be very similar to the generators being built for the Canadian Niagara Power Co., and I am, therefore, showing a section of one of these."'45 On the other hand, Electrical Development did risk the total cen­tralization of switching;46 that design was not, however, adopted by later plants who turned instead to the Ontario Power unit value plan. The Toronto transmission incorpora­ted the three phase, 60 kV standards introduced by Canadian 
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Niagara and Ontario Power.47 
Aside from differences in switching arrangements, the gen­erating unit and related electrical equipment became stan­dardized approximately for the three firms based at Niagara Falls, Ontario, and that standardization resulted in mar­keting competition, Niagara Co. engineers had developed internally their generator design and located their most advanced work in the subsidiary Canadian Niagara GS. Both Westinghouse and GE had manufactured Niagara Co. designs, and performed the standardizing role whereby these designs diffused to competitors. Firm-specific know-how thus be­came approximately standardized at Niagara Falls, Ontario. Competitors failed to shake the Niagara Co.1s hold on the local market — despite a serious effort by the Mackenzie Syndicate.48 Consequently, the Syndicate decided to supple­ment its Toronto market. In 1906, the Syndicate announced the formation of the Niagara Falls Electrical Transmission Co. which would compete with Niagara Lockport in the safe, established markets of upstate New York. Inter-company technological standardization had sparked the search for long distance markets which, in turn, fostered an interest in exporting power. Canadian Niagara, Ontario Power, and Electrical Development each declared by 1906 their inten­tion of engaging significantly in the export of power from Niagara Falls, Ontario — plans which upset development enthusiasts in Ontario. 
NIAGARA TECHNOLOGY AND THE ORIGINS OF ONTARIO HYDRO 
The introduction and evolution of Niagara Co. technology also ignited the formation of a public movement whose de­mands for public Niagara power resulted in 1906 in the es­tablishment of a public enterprise, Ontario Hydro. This movement evolved from the articulation of a general devel­opment philosophy based upon hydroelectricity (and HV transmission) through a voluntary association stage to the final phase of formal political organization; the state of the art of Niagara-based technology played a leading role in each stage. Generally, contemporary development enthu­siasts caught the public imagination by pointing to the long distance transmission of water power, or 'white coal,' as the golden key to Ontario's industrialization. H.V. Nelles, in his Volltict* o £ Vavtlopmznt, has correctly placed this movement in the political context of contempor­ary development issues in Ontario — but the technological context must also be considered. Indeed, the evolution and diffusion of Niagara Co. technology accounted for the timing and structure of Ontario Hydro's plans. Ontario Hydro found its niche in the advancing HV transmission front of this international technology. 
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Nelles has explained that Ontario entered in the 1890's a period of particular concern with resource development and primary manufacturing. The Canadian tradition of crown lands and public participation in development contrasted sharply with American traditions of private ownership and development. In 1898f a legal decision firmly placed under provincial jurisdiction provincial resource ownership. Ontario then tried to duplicate on a province-wide scope the national government's National Policy which had includ­ed the public development of a national railroad — a powerful precedent for public power.49 Indeed, popular en­thusiasm for Niagara technology resembled the prior genera­tion's fascination with the railroad. 
In May of 1899, Thomas Keefer, one of Canada's best known railroad engineers, presented to the Royal Society of Canada the end-of-the-century Presidential address on the topic of 'Canadian Water Power and its Electrical Product in Relation to the Undeveloped Resources of the Dominion.'5 Keefer pointed out that Canada possessed key resources which could be developed into primary manufacturing indus­tries only with the transmission of cheap electric power, and mentioned specifically electrochemistry, electrometal­lurgy, and pulp and paper. Electric power transmission offered Canadians an alternative to the traditional export of raw resources. Keefer thus identified hydroelectricity (and its transmission) as Canada's most important undevel­oped resource. Keefer was not alone. At about the same time, Prof. R.B. Owens, Chariman of McGill's Electrical Department, delivered a McGill University Lecture on the same theme.51 Both men especially had in mind the Niagara precedent for the development of each province's rich water power resources. Their philosophy represented the enormous unforeseen impact which a new technology may have in a foreign environment. Not surprisingly, Niagara Falls, Ontario became the primary target of development enthusi­asts who wished to use electric power to restructure fun­damentally the economy, just as the Niagara Co. failed to recognize that these attitudes formed a condition of cor­porate success in the Ontario market — as much as atti­tudes and legislation related to aesthetics had influenced its early work before 189 5. Aesthetic concerns about the spoiliation of the Falls had resulted in legislation which created public parklands and therefore forced a Niagara en­terprise to design a technological solution to the problem of siting a GS outside of the parklands. Now, development concerns raised questions about the timing of Niagara Co. plans — and soon about private ownership of Niagara devel­opment enterprises. 
During 1899, the Government of Ontario attacked the exclu­sive franchise of the Niagara Co. Pointing out the firm's failure to develop by 1 November 189 8 10,000 hp at the Ontario site, a franchise condition, the Government asked 
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the High Court of Justice to void at least the exclusive 
clause of the franchise. The Niagara Co. defended itself 
with two arguments: long distance transmission problems 
remained unsolved; and, the company had supplied the local 
existing demand of 1,000 hp. In January 1899, the High 
Court of Justice sustained the arguments of the power com-
pany I Even the conservative Canadian Electrical Neute ex-
pressed skepticism about this legal decision: an editorial 
pointed to both Niagara Falls, NY and Hamilton as cases in 
support of the argument that Niagara power supply created 
demand, and that the purpose of the franchise was not to 
supply existing demand but to create more demand.5 The 
Ontario Government then negotiated an out-of-court settle-
ment with the Niagara Co. and announced in August 1899 the 
new agreement. The Niagara Co. relinquished its exclusive 
rights in return for reduced rental rates and a long term 
franchise. Competition at Niagara Falls, Ontario was now 
possible and was expected to accelerate the planning and 
construction of Canadian plants.53 Niagara engineers then 
turned to Canadian Niagara design plans and the Ontario 
Power Co. formed immediately to plan a competitive project. 
Politicians, publishers, and even the conservative Toronto 
Board of Trade were calling by 1899 for a public Niagara 
development. Alderman F.S. Spence, a leader in the Toronto 
group, urged the Board of Trade to investigate seriously 
the public option.54 As it became clearer that Niagara 
companies might not include regional transmission in south-
western Ontario as part of a Niagara-Toronto project, 
E.W.B. Snider of St. Jacobs and Daniel B. Detweiler of 
Berlin (now Kitchener) began to organize various municipal-
ities which allied during 1902 with the Toronto movement. 
The Pennsylvania coal strikes of 1902 produced an energy 
crisis in Ontario which helped to catalyse these observers 
into a coherent voluntary association. Snider and Detweiler 
organized a meeting for 19 June 1902 in Berlin where Aid. 
F.S. Spence and Ontario Power Co. engineer Charles H. 
Mitchell addressed an audience of manufacturers and busi-
ness men from Toronto and four municipalities (Berlin, 
Guelph, Preston, and Waterloo).55 Warning against the 
perils of private monopoly — like the Mackenzie Syndi-
cate — Spence proposed a government commission to transmit 
power to all interested municipalities. Charles Mitchell 
familiarized the audience with the latest state of the art 
of Niagara technology and outlined Ontario Power's ideas 
for long distance transmission,56 a plan which suggested 
the technological feasibility of Spence's proposals. The 
meeting then formed a twenty-one-member investigatory com-
mittee headed by Snider and Detweiler 'to prepare a co-
operation plan for the securing of a supply of electrical 
power for manufacturing interests on the most favorable 
terms possible'57 and to present its findings at a convene 
tion scheduled for February 190 3. 
85 
In January 190 3, the Mackenzie Syndicate secured its Niag­ara development franchise. Alarmed by the prospect of a private monopoly in Toronto in the midst of an energy cri­sis, the Syndicate's Niagara plans immediately alienated the province's financial and manufacturing communities. The Canadian Manufacturers Association announced to Premier George Ross a lack of confidence in the pricing policies of private Niagara companies and formally threw its support behind the municipal movement. Gaining momentum, sixty-seven representatives of municipalities, boards of trade, and manufacturing associations attended on 17 February 190 3 the Berlin Convention where the Snider and Detweiler com­mittee urged legislation permitting collective municipal action 'to develop and transmit such power; or to buy power delivered.'5& Pointing out the promise of abundant power supply at Niagara, Snider personally favoured the priority of transmission. The report won the support of Mayor Urquhart of Toronto, Mayor Adam Beck of London, many manu­facturers, and most of the Ontario press. 
Premier George Ross, who favoured private enterprise, could no longer ignore the political weight of the public Niagara power movement. He appointed the Ontario Power Commission to launch a three-year study of the Niagara situation. Chaired by Snider, the Commission included Adam Beck and Canadian Manufacturers Association President P.W. Ellis. The Commission employed Ross and Holgate, a consulting hy­droelectric firm in Montréal, and Reginald Fessenden of Washington, DC as a special consultant; Fessenden, a Canadian, was a well-known electrical expert who special­ized in communications. Ross and his Liberal Party lost the January 1905 provincial election to James Whitney's Conservative Party. Premier Whitney appointed Adam Beck to the Cabinet post of Minister without Portfolio — the de-facto position being Minister of Power.^ Assuming leadership of the movement, Beck established in July 190 5 by Order-in-Council (Cabinet action not requiring Legis­lative approval) the separate Hydro-Electric Power Com­mission of Inquiry which he chaired. Beck pulled Cecil B. Smith from his post as Resident Engineer of the Canadian Niagara project and appointed him Chief Engineer for the new Commission. 
The Ontario Power Commission published its report on 28 March 1906, and Beck's Commission published its findings one week later. Both reports referred to the 'supply push' development philosophy expressed by Keefer and others but offered different means to this end. Snider has asked Ross and Holgate to limit their investigation to seven mu­nicipalities which were 'pre-eminently manufacturing com­munities,' *>0 and to estimate the costs of Niagara-based generation, transmission and distribution. Accordingly, Ross and Holgate designed a 60,000 hp project but also initiated a more cost-competitive option of extending the 
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transmission to include eighteen localities whose combined needs amounted to 10.0,0.00'hp —«* approximating the scale of a standard Niagara GS. Ross and Holgate thus shaped the project according to Niagara dynamics: Niagara project costs demanded a large production capacity which, in turn, demanded a large market. 
Reginald Fessenden approved the Ross and Holgate report and focussed his own report on the relationship between a tech­nological state of the art and the feasibility of a public project. Essentially, Fessenden argued that municipal co­operation was feasible only l^ tkt t&cnnology MJCU Atandaid-
Izzd since obsolescence and public bankruptcy could result from technological advances. Accordingly, he compared the Ross and Holgate plans to the state of the art of Niagara technology: 
The engineering work proposed is of a com­paratively simple character. The hydraulic and electrical apparatus has been standardized. The character of the rock to be excavated for the tunnels and wheelpits is known and advan­tage can be taken of the experience obtained in constructing similar works in the neighbor­hood. .. The transmission lines are also of a type which is now standard, and there is nothing experimental about any part of the engineering work.61 
Fessenden predicted that there would be no new important advances in the state of the art and that, therefore, the Commission faced low risks of obsolescence. This principle articulated by Fessenden also formed a cornerstone idea of the report by Beck's Commission. 
Beck's report consisted essentially of the Chief Engineer's report prefaced and summarized by the Commissioners. Chief Engineer Cecil B. Smith was personally familiar with the state of the art of the pioneering Canadian Niagara pro­ject. Detailing cost estimates based on the Canadian Niagara and Electrical Development plants,62 and pointing out that no truly viable plant sites remained at the Falls, Smith recommended that the Hydro Commission avoid the high costs of Niagara GS construction and equipment by pur­chasing power from existing plants. Allotting that saving to transmission costs, Smith devised a 'transmission for­mula' based upon standard Niagara technology (25 Hz current at 60 kV transmission) and upon knowledge of recent sales of large blocs of power at Niagara'63 (proprietary sales information). Smith conceived of this transmission coop­erative as similar to an electrochemical customer of 24 hour bloc power: since such customers most improved load factor, the power company favoured them with the lowest power rates. Based on these conditions and estimates, Smith calculated that Niagara power could compete with. 
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local energy sources (notably steam-electric sources) in thirty-nine municipalities. 
Smith termed this territory as the ^Niagara District1; using the same methods, he identified four other Districts and reported on them within a year. Absorbing fully the Keefer philosophy, Smith included in each report the devel­opmental impact of hydro in each District. Within a few weeks of Beck's Niagara District report, the Legislature established the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario (popularly termed Ontario Hydro) as a quasi-autonomous or­ganization with authority to regulate and develop water power in the province. Ontario Hydro was established as both a Niagara-based transmission organization and a pro­vincial development and regulation agency. Niagara tech­nology thus merged with indigenous traditions and values, and resulted in a uniquely Canadian institution. Opting to form his own private consulting firm, Smith recommended that Hydro hire as permanent Chief Engineer an expert in HV transmission technology. Hydro was, after all, just one more enterprise in the advancing front of Niagara-based HV technology — like Niagara Lockport or Toronto Niagara. To sum up, both the technological feasibility of the public power movement and Hydro's detailed strategies were struc­tured by the technological state of the art based at Niagara —. including both, the evolution of Niagara Co. de­signs and their transfer and diffusion to competing, pri­vate firms. Smith's detailed project plans rested entirely upon Niagara standards. 
Two events thoroughly shocked every enterprise based at Niagara. During 190 3, the American Civic Association and the Governor-General of Canada rekindled the old concern with Niagara aesthetics by expressing alarm about the aesthetic impact of the new projects. They issued a joint resolution which urged 'immediate measures for the preser­vation of the cataract.'*^ President Theodore Roosevelt ordered investigatory reports and recommendations. On 29 June 1906, President Roosevelt signed into law the Burton Act which placed limits upon Niagara water diver­sions and power export from Niagara Falls, Ontario. The measure was a temporary expedient supported by the Canadian Government; after negotiations, the Boundary Waters Treaty adopted the Burton Acts provisions as international law. For our present purposes, the gap between export plans and limits is relevant (see Table #1). Of course, the Ontario Power and Electrical Development subsidiary transmission organizations had planned larger import supplies over the longer term. U.S. Secretary of War William H. Taft, em­powered to enforce the measures, refused to adjust these export limits. Consequently, the strategies of all three projects were ruptured seriously. Competition for Ontario markets inevitably became cut-throat — especially between the Mackenzie Syndicate and Ontario Hydro. 
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Table #1 
Plant CGS) Export Import Import Limit Applicant Request 
Canadian Niagara 52,000 hp 
Ontario Power 60,000 hp 
Niagara Falls 121,000 hp Power Co. 
Niagara, 90,000 hp Lockport and Ontario Power Co. 
Electrical Development 46,000 hp Niagara Falls 62,500 hp Electrical Transmission Co. 
Export Limits, 1906 65 
The second event compounded the confusion. After years of design efforts, Harold Buck co-introduced in 190 7 a suspen­ded insulator which promised safe HV transmission insula­tion far beyond the existing 60 kV standard at Niagara.66 Given the competition and the Burton Act, the new design was useless to the Niagara Co. Only Ontario Hydro had not yet begun to construct transmission lines. On the other hand, Hydro's adoption of the new insulator would make ob­solete all of Smith's designs, surveys, and cost estimates based on 60 kV! A higher voltage transmission would, how­ever, yield cheaper rates and thus help Hydro to compete with the Mackenzie Syndicate for Toronto markets. In order to opt for the new insulator, Hydro would need to ignore Fessenden's warning against public involvement in advanced, non-standard technology. Adopting the new insulator meant insulator tests, experimental transforming and protective electrical equipment, experimental transmission tower de­signs, and new surveys if the suspended insulator was to be used properly in an HV line far beyond the Niagara 60 kV standard. Ontario Hydro scrapped Smith's plans and decided to pioneer.67 Once again, a new technological design based upon years of work by Harold Buck and others at the Niagara Co. would spark considerable turbulence. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Niagara Co.'s design work sparked within ten years an energy revolution in Ontario (and Quebec) , how did this occur? The Niagara Co.'s efforts to improve and expand on a system basis resulted in its loss of potential customers 
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to those power companies in Québec and Hamilton which adop­ted the Niagara Co. model as well as its loss of an exclu­sive development franchise at Niagara Falls, Ontario. Quickly, the firm then transferred its most evolved designs to its Canadian Niagara interconnected subsidiary and thus accomplished the form of its technological dream. But when the Ontario Power Co. and the Electrical Development Co. largely imitated the Canadian Niagara designs, these competing enterprises acknowledged the Niagara Co.*s grip on the local markets and implemented high voltage transmis­sion plans to compete for distant markets. Inevitably, the Niagara Co. lost the Toronto market to Electrical Develop­ment whose owners, the Mackenzie Syndicate, also controlled Toronto's utilities. Finally, the Niagara Co. had sparked a movement for public power in Ontario and lost to that group its Residence Engineer of Canadian Niagara: Cecil B. Smith became Chief Engineer of Ontario Hydro. Clearly, the Niagara Co.'s technological design accomplishments consti­tuted the central force in each of these stages of tech­nology transfer and diffusion. 
I have argued that the Niagara Co. approached with impres­sive technological rationality its internal design evolu­tion but that the firm's (perhaps inevitable) failure to synchronize this design evolution with private and public demands in the host environment of Ontario resulted in the collapse of its international Niagara monopoly dream. The firm's system design rationality contrasted sharply with the relatively chaotic or turbulent stages of transfer and diffusion marked by the Niagara Co.'s progressive loss of control over its technology. Between the franchise rene­gotiation of 1899 and the Burton Act of 1906, the 'free market' period, the flurry of activity was more technolog­ically imitative than creative: both the private and pub­lic enterprises evolved according to the dynamics of Niagara Co. designs. Indeed, Cecil B. Smith's plans for Ontario Hydro followed from his 'transmission formula' which rested entirely on the basis of Niagara Co. design standards and their diffusion at the Falls. 
Yet Ontario Hydro was more than a public Niagara develop­ment agency. As a regulation agency, Hydro could ensure some order in hydroelectric development in the host envir­onment of Ontario. The Burton Act of 1906 simultaneously imposed international order by appointing diversion and ex­port (or trade) ceilings. The extent to which this inter­national legislation ignored — indeed undermined — the strategies of Niagara-based private enterprises is truly astonishing! By reducing hydroelectric exports from Ontario, the Burton Act, perhaps unintentionally, presented to Ontario a comparative advantage in subsequent Niagara-based developments. Consequently, this international regu­lation only strengthened the effective authority of Ontario Hydro. After 1906, Niagara-based hydroelectric evolution 
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would proceed in this politically^struetured context. Is it surprising thatf as of 1907, Ontario Hydro took, up the torch of technological design creativity? 
NOTES 
This article draws from Chapters II and III of my disserta­tion, 'The Niagara Frontier: The Evolution of Electric Power Systems in New York and Ontario, 1880-19 35* (Univer­sity of Pennsylvania, 1981J. The dissertation was based archivally upon the Niagara Archives in the George Arents Research Library at Syracuse University, documents files in the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation History Office in Syracuse, and Ontario Hydro archives in Toronto. Unfortun­ately, company records related to this critical period of technology transfer appear to have been lost or destroyed (especially in the post World War II era, the systematic destruction of such technology transfer records is apparent­ly the norm, not the exception). I therefore drew heavily upon technical articles in engineering journals for this turn^of-the-century period: the Canadian Ele.ctfU.ccLl blew* (CEWI and the Tfianàactions o& the kmenZcan Institute o^ 
Electrical Engineer [Tnan& AIEE). CEN, the Canadian equi­valent of Electrical Would, is an excellent source of his­torical information although it tends to lack biographical data. At present, standard biographical dictionaries rarely include sketches of electrical engineers which leaves elec­trical historians with no simple means of collecting such information. One would like to know, for instance, where J.A. Kammerer received his training and experience before his work at Royal Electric. Certainly, one cannot write the full history of the evolution, transfer and diffusion of any technological system without biographical or profes­sional sketches of the engineers involved. 
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